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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506 12 4 73 - 4 3 7 9

July 27, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM COLBY

FROM:

A. W. MARSHALL

SUBJECT:

Follow-up on Discussion of 20 July

I want to comment further on two matters covered briefly during our meeting of 20 July. The first of these is your determination to produce more useful and significant products for the top level decisionmakers. As you said, this means getting at what the Soviets think, the bureaucratic politics of major issues and providing richer and more interesting explanations of the things that we see them doing. Proctor's proposed Political Research Office is an appropriate part of a program to provide higher quality products. So is the new analysis R&D effort that Carl Duckett has started. However, I believe any effort to produce the desired products must be planned as a coordinated set of programs carried out over a number of years. We have to think in terms of three or five year programs that will gradually develop and assemble the kinds of people needed, organize them effectively, carry out appropriate R&D on promising new analytical methods, and perhaps create under contract external centers of excellence devoted to particular problem areas or styles of analysis, for example bureaucratic politics, elite analyses, etc. There will be also some new requirements for collection that will take time to gather the new kinds of information.

Who never you or some of your people are ready, I would like to hear your views on this matter. What are current views as to an appropriate strategy for developing in the community and in this country the capabilities to produce the kinds of materials you and I agree are needed? What are the key programs? How can they be carried out? What does a good five year plan look like? What might it cost? One of the problems I have had in the past is the reluctance of the people in the community to talk seriously about a long term, programmatic approach to improving the quality of the intelligence product. I am convinced we need such an approach, and now see the start of that in the community.

My second item is stimulated by the memoranda you gave me establishing a group of national intelligence officers. I think it is a very good idea particularly in its structuring by regional areas. It fits in well with the proposed reorganization of the USIB Committee structure that you are also considering. I would like comment on the tasks of the officers and their selection.

An important issue is whether they are to be primarily concerned with management or the production of substantive products. The distinction is not clearcut, but you have proposed a major set of tasks to be performed:

- (a) To be familiar with the community's collection and analytical effort and to influence its direction.
- (b) To maintain continuous contact with consumers and serve as a link to producers.
- (c) To oversee national-level intelligence responses such as NIE's, NSSM support and DCI presentations.

Any one of these could be a full time job, and the tendency for many intelligence hands will be to gravitate to production. You may want this focus, in essence creating a body of high-level analysts similar to ONE. On the other hand, I think the most useful contribution of these individuals would be in management -- using their positions to improve the coordination of collection efforts and the analysis of intelligence and to link producers to high level consumers.

Consequently the selection of these individuals is important. My sense is that the agencies will recommend individuals who are area experts, perhaps not even the best of these. But the demands of the tasks you propose suggest a need for aggressive, management oriented individuals. The national intelligence officers resemble product or project managers in industry. They have unclear lines of authority over other organizations, a demanding task of coordination and a need to rely on personal influence. Industry has normally chosen its more aggressive managers for such tasks, and I think you should give strong consideration to selecting similarly oriented individuals.

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